Which versions of comander-cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of comander-cli are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate comander-cli if I installed it?

comander-cli establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed comander-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If comander-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is comander-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — comander-cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018232 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find comander-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for comander-cli (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging comander-cli across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

comander-clinpm

comander-cli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14170) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in comander-cli (npm)

MAL-2026-14170

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall comander-cli

What this malware does

comander-cli is a typosquat of the popular 'commander' package whose index.js exports an empty object, providing no advertised functionality. All behavior is in scripts/postinstall.js, which runs automatically on npm install. The script XOR-decodes obfuscated byte arrays with the hardcoded key 'stf2026' to reconstruct a remote download URL and Windows shell/powershell bridge commands, fetches a Windows executable, writes it to %TEMP%\main.exe, and launches it detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide. On Linux hosts running under WSL (detected via WSL_DISTRO_NAME, WSLENV, and /proc/version containing 'microsoft'), the script assembles an obfuscated bridge command and passes it to child_process.exec to install and execute the payload on the underlying Windows host, escaping the WSL boundary. The postinstall also POSTs a JSON install beacon over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare IP 193.70.34.101:20099/vote, with the host reconstructed from a split string array (['193','70','34','101'].join('.')) to evade literal-IP pattern matching. Obfuscated URLs, split-array IP construction, empty library surface, typosquat naming, and install-time detached execution of an attacker-supplied binary are all present.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8296169da90107eec2a24127137eacf4a47dfca0c780111705aa542c3159d626

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for comander-cli (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging comander-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
comander-cli establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If comander-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks comander-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. comander-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018232

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks comander-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database