Which versions of comand are malicious?

The following npm versions of comand are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate comand if I installed it?

comand is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove comand, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed comand — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If comand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is comand part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — comand is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018253 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find comand across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for comand (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging comand across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

comandnpm

comand is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14169) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in comand (npm)

MAL-2026-14169

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall comand

What this malware does

On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js executes automatically. It first POSTs a JSON body containing the resolved host platform (Windows/MacOS/Linux, with WSL detection) to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote; the IP is assembled from a string array (['193','70','34','101'].join('.')) to hide it from static inspection. It then XOR-decodes (key 'stf2026') a hardcoded URL and, on Windows or via a PowerShell bridge from WSL, downloads main.exe from https://github.com/braz1/qPzM50V1AKG0rVlH/releases/download/null/main.exe into %TEMP% and spawns it detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide set. The WSL branch invokes powershell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass through a decoded bridge script. All network destinations and shell command fragments (ADDON_ENC, BRIDGE_LAUNCHER_ENC, BRIDGE_SCRIPT_*_ENC) are stored as XOR-encoded integer arrays reconstructed at runtime via an unpackSegment routine. The GitHub owner (braz1) does not match the npm publisher, the binary is unsigned and unverified, and the package name 'comand' resembles a typosquat of 'command'.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0d3576e830f201f4264c061dc377c51fa35bab19543a98c0feb316305051190b

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for comand (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging comand across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
comand is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove comand, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If comand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks comand before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. comand on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018253

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks comand-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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