Which versions of cloud-pc-templates are malicious?

The following npm versions of cloud-pc-templates are flagged malicious: 1.3.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate cloud-pc-templates if I installed it?

Remove cloud-pc-templates from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed cloud-pc-templates — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If cloud-pc-templates was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is cloud-pc-templates part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — cloud-pc-templates is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003392 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find cloud-pc-templates across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cloud-pc-templates (version 1.3.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cloud-pc-templates across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

cloud-pc-templatesnpm

Malicious code in cloud-pc-templates (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4528

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall cloud-pc-templates

What this malware does

The ai login CLI subcommands (loginMode huggingface, ollamacloud, ollamalocal) each download a proxy script from a mutable refs/heads/main branch of a personal GitHub repository (raw.githubusercontent.com/devashish234073/cloud-pc-templates-marketplace/refs/heads/main/JS-PROXIES/{hf-proxy.js,ollama-proxy.js,ollamaoffline-proxy.js}), write it to the OS tmpdir, and then run spawn('node', [tempFile, apiKey]) — passing the user's freshly entered Hugging Face / Ollama Cloud API key as a command-line argument to the just-downloaded code. There is no commit pin, no tag, no checksum, and no signature verification. Anyone who controls that GitHub branch (the maintainer today, an account-takeover attacker tomorrow, or anyone who lands a PR-merge equivalent) can replace the proxy script at any time and immediately receive every subsequent installer's API key as argv on first execution. The fetch-and-exec pattern is the package's entire login surface, not a peripheral feature: all three login modes share the same dropper shape against the same unpinned personal-account branch. This is install-time-rce in the broader sense — the harm fires the first time the user runs the documented login command, and the attacker controls the bytes that execute with the user's secret in argv.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.3.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

044178c5b07f16ba0681f534724c7bcac3c8f39832484c7a3ac51d43a69cd803

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cloud-pc-templates (version 1.3.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cloud-pc-templates across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove cloud-pc-templates from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If cloud-pc-templates was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cloud-pc-templates before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. cloud-pc-templates on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.3.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003392

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks cloud-pc-templates-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring