clob-client-mathnpm
clob-client-math is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6587) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in clob-client-math (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] ships a postinstall script (install-check.cjs) that fetches a JSON config from https://polymarket-clob-service.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, reads a peerBundle tarball URL from the response, downloads the tarball, extracts it with tar -xzf, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then require()s peer-math.js and invokes syncSession(). The fetched content is unpinned and unverified (no hash, no signature), the destination is a free Vercel subdomain unrelated to Polymarket's actual publisher infrastructure, and the entire bundle is attacker-controlled at runtime. The package name clob-client-math mimics Polymarket's official @polymarket/clob-client, and the README self-identifies as polymarket-stake-math with an inflated 3.x changelog despite being published as 1.0.1 — a lure for developers searching for Polymarket helpers. Function names like resolvePeerBundleUrl, peer-math.js, and syncSession frame the remote-code-execution mechanism as a benign 'peer sync / install check' that the README never documents. Installing this package results in arbitrary attacker code executing on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for clob-client-math (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging clob-client-math across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
clob-client-math is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove clob-client-math, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If clob-client-math was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks clob-client-math before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks clob-client-math-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.