clob-client-mathnpm
Malicious code in clob-client-math (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall script fetches a JSON config from datasecure-service.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, downloads a tarball from a URL contained in that response, extracts it under a.peer/ directory, runs npm install inside the extracted tree, then require()s the resulting peer-math.js and invokes its syncSession() function. The fetched payload is unpinned, unverified (no hash or signature check), mutable, and hosted on infrastructure unrelated to any documented Polymarket publisher. The dropper path is framed in console output as a benign 'install check' / 'peer sync', while the package's advertised purpose is Kelly-criterion stake sizing math — no part of that purpose requires fetching and executing remote code at install time. The package name and README also impersonate the legitimate @polymarket/clob-client ecosystem, indicating the lure targets Polymarket developers. Installing this package causes arbitrary attacker-controlled code to execute on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for clob-client-math (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging clob-client-math across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
clob-client-math is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove clob-client-math, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If clob-client-math was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks clob-client-math before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks clob-client-math-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.