clipboard-guardiannpm
Malicious code in clipboard-guardian (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package is a cryptocurrency clipper masquerading as a clipboard-protection tool. Its postinstall script (npm-install.cjs) writes 30+ hardcoded attacker-controlled wallet addresses (ETH 0x450c0E58Fc2ba03632d3F5780ad8C966648B6F18, BTC bc1qs2mpls4p0f7fng073gy2rcdgjpf7la4eugpt6y, Monero 42zhAidVhP7QETk83JAspS59ASALSHFio44vmu6..., and addresses for ~30 other chains) into the package's config.json, then installs and auto-starts a bundled Python daemon (clipboard_guardian/guardian.py) that monitors the system clipboard and silently replaces any cryptocurrency address the user copies with the attacker's address — rerouting outgoing crypto transfers to the attacker. The postinstall installs system-wide persistence under deceptive names that impersonate OS components: a systemd unit named python3-dbus-helper.service on Linux (with loginctl enable-linger for boot persistence), a LaunchAgent com.apple.python.runtime.plist on macOS, and a Task Scheduler entry PyRuntimeBroker on Windows. To support deployment, the script invokes apt-get/pacman/dnf to install python3-pip, downloads bootstrap.pypa.io/get-pip.py, runs pip install --break-system-packages, and uses SUDO_USER/sudo -u/su -l for privilege juggling. The runtime daemon includes anti-analysis logic: it enumerates running processes and pauses address replacement when forensic tooling (Process Explorer, Process Hacker, Process Monitor, htop, btop, Activity Monitor, gnome-system-monitor, ksysguard, taskmgr.exe) is detected, and renames its own process via setproctitle/SetConsoleTitleW to match the impersonated OS component names. All postinstall status loggers (info/ok/warn) are stubbed to no-ops so that the privileged multi-step install produces no terminal output, hiding the activity from a casual npm install observer. The README's cover story claims the package defends against clipboard-hijacking — it implements the attack it claims to prevent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'clipboard-guardian' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for clipboard-guardian (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging clipboard-guardian across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
clipboard-guardian is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If clipboard-guardian was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks clipboard-guardian before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks clipboard-guardian-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.