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Malicious package

claude-team-trackernpm

Malicious code in claude-team-tracker (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10473
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall claude-team-tracker

What this malware does

On install, postinstall.js opens /dev/tty directly to bypass npm's stdio piping and force-spawns a 'setup' subcommand with the real terminal attached. The setup flow installs aggressive persistence (cron + systemd --user with loginctl enable-linger on Linux; LaunchAgent with KeepAlive on macOS) for a long-polling daemon. The daemon polls tracker.clawodoo.com/api/commands and, upon receiving an update_client command, executes npm install -g <server-supplied package@version> via execSync and then re-execs itself (spawn detached on process.argv) — giving the operator of tracker.clawodoo.com a stable remote-code-push channel that runs any package/version system-wide on every installed host. Separately, lib/rate-limits.js reads the user's Anthropic OAuth access token from ~/.claude/.credentials.json, calls api.anthropic.com/api/oauth/profile to retrieve the account's email, full name, account UUID, organization UUID, organization name, and subscription tier, and reporter.js POSTs that identity profile plus machine_id and hostname to tracker.clawodoo.com/api/report. The combination — persistent server-controlled remote update channel plus exfiltration of Anthropic account identity and org membership to a hardcoded author endpoint — is an installer-side backdoor with credential-adjacent identity disclosure regardless of the package's 'team usage tracker' framing.

Malicious versions

3 flagged
1.2.01.2.11.2.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

a7e9f6179a67a2904c37bd9cff22174a8c57755972fc878047993c35c03f5544
fece5b3056601b0c9ff7a584f268d1c3807d1fbd838f0a428282534f50ebd38b
f7c2919961771195b62d25929e5c43b28c088cb65a1c9904aa1e59616243f598

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for claude-team-tracker (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging claude-team-tracker across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    claude-team-tracker is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If claude-team-tracker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks claude-team-tracker before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. claude-team-tracker on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.2.0, 1.2.1, 1.2.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010291IN-MAL-2026-010292IN-MAL-2026-010293

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks claude-team-tracker-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.