claude-channel-telegramnpm
claude-channel-telegram is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15624) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 9.9.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in claude-channel-telegram (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dependency-confusion lure with no functional code. package.json wires both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks to run index.js, which reads os.hostname() and issues an HTTPS request to https://eo8f3m3ho26a0nm.m.pipedream.net/claude-channel-telegram?h=<hostname>, sending the installing machine's hostname to an attacker-controlled Pipedream webhook on every npm install. The package name evokes an Anthropic Claude / Telegram integration and the version is pinned implausibly high (9.9.9) to win resolution against an internal package of the same name. package.json also declares the package as its own dependency and lists requests (a typosquat of request), consistent with a namespace-squat payload rather than a real library.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for claude-channel-telegram (version 9.9.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging claude-channel-telegram across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
claude-channel-telegram is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove claude-channel-telegram, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If claude-channel-telegram was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks claude-channel-telegram before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks claude-channel-telegram-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.