claims-patch-urlnpm
claims-patch-url is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12631) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.3.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in claims-patch-url (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] presents an empty ClaimsPatchUrl shell class in index.js and unconditionally requires./compat.js on load. On require(), compat.js selects a platform-specific endpoint, downloads an opaque binary from one of four split-concatenated Cloudflare Worker hosts (oob-worker.cf100-.workers.dev through oob-worker.cf103-.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT resolveTxt covert-channel fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to /var/tmp or TEMP under cover-story filenames (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe,.cache<hex>,.analytics_state), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. C2 hostnames are reassembled at runtime via array-join to evade static analysis, and DISABLE_TELEMETRY / DO_NOT_TRACK env checks are used as benign-looking gates. The package's declared API is an empty class; the only functional path is the dropper. Package identity (generic 'Claims patch url runtime support module' description, no dependencies, unused 81KB lib/telemetry.js sibling) is consistent with a typosquat/decoy.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for claims-patch-url (version 35.3.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging claims-patch-url across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
claims-patch-url establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If claims-patch-url was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks claims-patch-url before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks claims-patch-url-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.