I already installed checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

What are the indicators of compromise (IOCs) for checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am?

Known SHA-256 artifact hashes for the malicious checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am release(s): 3562600b17ec6918b0ebfda948a4579addb4bf1d55a39c696bf6b10fcc15020f. Match these against your package cache and build artifacts to confirm exposure.

Is checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015184 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am (version 35.2.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-amnpm

checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12586) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am (npm)

MAL-2026-12586

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am

What this malware does

On require(), index.js loads support.js which assembles Cloudflare Workers hostnames (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) via array-join concealment and fetches a platform-specific binary over HTTPS, with a DNS-TXT base64-chunk fallback channel served from sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru and net.dl.wel1.ru. The retrieved bytes are written to a temp path with a disguised name (.cache<rnd> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe on Windows), chmod 0755'd, and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start, so the payload runs at import time with the installer's privileges. A second dropper implementation with the same fetch/write/chmod 755/spawn primitives is bundled in lib/telemetry.js under an 'Analytics SDK' cover story, using concatenated API names (chmod+Sync, child_+process) and base64 buffer decoding. Package name and 'telemetry/analytics' framing are cover-story labels; the actual behavior is remote code delivery and execution on the installer's host from author-controlled infrastructure.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

35.2.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3562600b17ec6918b0ebfda948a4579addb4bf1d55a39c696bf6b10fcc15020f

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am (version 35.2.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 35.2.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015184

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks checkout-post-installment-client-agreement-accept-am-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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