checkout-mobile-totalnpm
checkout-mobile-total is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12580) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.8.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in checkout-mobile-total (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, index.js unconditionally loads vendor.js, which fetches a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (e.g. oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) assembled by joining split string fragments, with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback to *.dl.wel1.ru. The retrieved payload is written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<rnd>, dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe), chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. No hash or signature verification is performed, hostnames are unrelated to any declared publisher, and the destinations are concealed via string-split obfuscation. Package name mimics a checkout/payments library, consistent with typosquat lure targeting mobile checkout tooling.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for checkout-mobile-total (version 35.8.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging checkout-mobile-total across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
checkout-mobile-total is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove checkout-mobile-total, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If checkout-mobile-total was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks checkout-mobile-total before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks checkout-mobile-total-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.