checkout-mobile-accountsnpm
checkout-mobile-accounts is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12570) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.6.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in checkout-mobile-accounts (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), the package loads platform.js which selects a per-OS asset path and downloads an executable payload from hostnames reconstructed at runtime via array-join to hide them from static analysis (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf99-9b3.workers.dev, and sdk/ext/pkg/net.dl.wel1.ru), with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback. The downloaded bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under names designed to mimic system diagnostics (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod 0755 is applied, and the file is spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. A lock file named.analytics_state is written to blend in as telemetry state. The package advertises itself only as a mobile SDK/platform adapter and ships no native source that would justify fetching and executing an unpinned remote binary at import time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for checkout-mobile-accounts (version 35.6.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging checkout-mobile-accounts across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
checkout-mobile-accounts is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove checkout-mobile-accounts, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If checkout-mobile-accounts was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks checkout-mobile-accounts before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks checkout-mobile-accounts-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.