checkout-desktop-totalnpm
checkout-desktop-total is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12561) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.6.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in checkout-desktop-total (npm)
What this malware does
On require of index.js, platform.js runs a setup() routine that unconditionally downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback channel under *.dl.wel1.ru (c.<domain> returns a chunk count, N.<domain> returns base64 chunks that are concatenated and decoded). Host literals are split into arrays and joined at runtime to evade grep-based scanning. The downloaded bytes are written to a disguised path — '.cache<rand>' under /tmp on Unix, 'dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe' under %TEMP% on Windows — chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b with windowsHide:true. An on-disk marker '.analytics_state' is written. The package name and its deceptive filenames impersonate benign tooling; there is no legitimate reason for a 'checkout-desktop-total' library entry to fetch and execute an opaque binary from a Cloudflare Workers host on import.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for checkout-desktop-total (version 35.6.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging checkout-desktop-total across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
checkout-desktop-total is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove checkout-desktop-total, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If checkout-desktop-total was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks checkout-desktop-total before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks checkout-desktop-total-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.