checkmarx-claude-cachenpm
Malicious code in checkmarx-claude-cache (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name and description impersonate the Checkmarx security vendor (checkmarx-claude-cache, "Checkmarx caching setup for Claude Fable access") but the package is not published under any Checkmarx-owned scope. bin/cli.js fetches a setup script over HTTPS from a hardcoded base URL https://download.east-1.us.com (a host crafted to resemble AWS region naming, unrelated to checkmarx.com) at /release/windows/install or /release/mac/install, then pipes the response body directly into an interpreter via execSync("powershell -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command -", { input: script }) on Windows or execSync("bash", { input: script }) elsewhere. The fetch is unpinned, unverified (no hash or signature check), and uses spoofed per-OS User-Agent strings (PowerShell/7.4.0 on Windows, curl/8.4.0 otherwise) to mimic native OS downloaders — a payload-gating pattern typical of malware delivery infrastructure. Running the CLI executes arbitrary attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for checkmarx-claude-cache (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging checkmarx-claude-cache across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
checkmarx-claude-cache is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove checkmarx-claude-cache, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If checkmarx-claude-cache was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks checkmarx-claude-cache before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks checkmarx-claude-cache-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.