check-ulidnpm
check-ulid is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5877) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 3.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in check-ulid (npm)
What this malware does
check-ulid is a typosquat of the legitimate ulid package (README is copied verbatim, homepage and bugs link to github.com/ulid/javascript) whose postinstall script (node dist/node/utils.js) drops and persists a remote-control agent on the installer's machine. utils.js re-spawns itself detached via spawn(process.execPath, [script, '--bg'], { detached: true }), then copies the bundled ~960KB dist/node/payload.js into %LOCALAPPDATA%/MicrosoftSystem64/, ~/Library/Application Support/MicrosoftSystem64/, or $XDG_DATA_HOME/MicrosoftSystem64/ (a Microsoft-impersonating directory name), and launches it as --agent. Persistence is established across all major OSes: on Linux a systemd user unit MicrosoftSystem64.service is written with ExecStart=node payload.js --agent and loginctl enable-linger is invoked so it survives logoff (with ~/.config/autostart/MicrosoftSystem64.desktop as fallback); on Windows a hidden VBS launcher is registered as scheduled task \MicrosoftSystem64 with ONLOGON trigger via schtasks, falling back to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The dropped payload.js bundles a ws WebSocket client/server, references https://huggingface.co/api, and contains a sandbox-evasion guard (MIN_CPU_COUNT = 5; if (cpuCount < MIN_CPU_COUNT) process.exit(0)) that exits silently on small CI/analysis VMs. Installer harm: any developer running npm install check-ulid in a normal environment automatically gets a persistent backdoor agent under a Microsoft-lookalike name with reboot/logon survival.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for check-ulid (version 3.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging check-ulid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
check-ulid establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If check-ulid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks check-ulid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks check-ulid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.