chatcc-agentnpm
chatcc-agent is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13259) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 0.8.24). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in chatcc-agent (npm)
What this malware does
chatcc-agent runs a daemon that connects to Tencent Cloud IM as a WebSocket client and treats inbound peer messages of type 'terminal_command', 'terminal_input', and 'terminal_pty_*' as instructions to spawn or write to a local shell / PTY on the installer's machine. In src/cclink-studio-remote.js and related handlers, _handleAdvancedCommand calls pty.spawn(shell, ['-lc', command],...) with the command string supplied by the remote IM peer, and handleInput forwards peer-supplied bytes into the active process's stdin. The result is a network-reachable, remote-controlled command-execution channel into the host that installed and runs the agent. Access is gated by JWT / paired-client authentication, but the channel, its bindings to a login shell, and the ability to stream arbitrary stdin exist by design and constitute a remote-shell surface regardless of how the package is described. Separately, the npm install script only performs a local native build (chmod of the shipped node-pty spawn-helper and compilation of a shipped C source with cc) and does not fetch or execute remote content.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chatcc-agent (version 0.8.24). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chatcc-agent across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove chatcc-agent from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If chatcc-agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chatcc-agent before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chatcc-agent-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.