channel-workernpm
Malicious code in channel-worker (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's runtime code implements a remote command-and-control agent rather than a normal library. bin/cli.js hardcodes the endpoint https://api.channel.tunasm.art and issues POST calls with host identifiers to that endpoint via fetch. lib/command-poller.js pairs child_process execution with GET/POST loops against a remote controller, taking command IDs from responses and executing OS commands (including ping) locally. lib/cache-server.js and lib/nst-manager.js reinforce the same shape: child_process combined with outbound POST and ping invocations to remote hosts. This is a poll-execute-report agent structure — installing or running this package registers the host with the operator of api.channel.tunasm.art and executes commands returned by that server, providing persistent remote access to the machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for channel-worker (version 2.5.39). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging channel-worker across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
channel-worker establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If channel-worker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks channel-worker before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks channel-worker-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.