chainlink-price-feed-aggregatornpm
Malicious code in chainlink-price-feed-aggregator (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name impersonates Chainlink branding while being published by an unrelated identity (author 'Web3 Developer Tools [email protected]', repo github.com/web3/...). The package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs node -e to perform an HTTPS GET to rqnyz-2605-7280-7--2000-c51.run.pinggy-free.link/npm/-/binary/telemetry — an anonymous Pinggy tunnel host with no relationship to the package's declared purpose (Chainlink price feeds) or publisher. The path is crafted to look like an npm registry binary path, and errors are swallowed via try/catch to keep the install silent. The fetch leaks the installer's IP, install timestamp, and confirms successful installation on a victim machine, acting as a recon beacon. The package's main entry is a 138-byte stub with no actual price-feed functionality, indicating the package is a lure rather than a working library. Brand-impersonating name + functionless stub + install-time beacon to anonymous tunnel infrastructure is the canonical supply-chain bait pattern.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chainlink-price-feed-aggregator (version 1.1.12). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chainlink-price-feed-aggregator across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chainlink-price-feed-aggregator establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If chainlink-price-feed-aggregator was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chainlink-price-feed-aggregator before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chainlink-price-feed-aggregator-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.