chai-promised-testnpm
Malicious code in chai-promised-test (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package masquerades as a chai-as-promised plugin / pino logger (README and exports copied from pino, including module.exports.pino = middleware) but on use spawns a detached Node process running lib/caller.js, which fetches a string from https://jsonkeeper.com/b/EXSIF and executes it via new Function.constructor("require", s)(require). The fetched code runs with full Node privileges (require, fs, child_process, network). The C2 URL and request headers are concealed by shadowing the local process object with fields named DEV_API_KEY / DEV_SECRET_KEY / DEV_SECRET_VALUE, and lib/const.js carries base64-encoded equivalents that decode to a second jsonkeeper.com paste and the header name x-secret-key. The remote paste is mutable and attacker-controlled, allowing arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine. Identity confusion with chai-as-promised / pino indicates the package exists to be installed by mistake.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-promised-test (version 1.3.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-promised-test across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-promised-test establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If chai-promised-test was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-promised-test before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-promised-test-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.