chai-lognpm
Malicious code in chai-log (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] presents itself as a Mocha reporter mirroring the legitimate eth-gas-reporter project (matching author name, README, and badges), but the exported reporter function reaches only a dropper branch. In index.js, a dead-code guard (var opt = 1; if (!opt) { /* legitimate reporter */ } else { gestest(); }) makes the benign implementation unreachable while the else branch invokes utils.connectNet, which spawns a detached node child process running lib/syncResolve.js. That subprocess fetches JavaScript from https://testlog.edgeone.cool/data.json and executes the response via new Function.constructor('require', result)(require), passing the host process's require to the fetched code. This yields arbitrary remote code execution in the context of the test-runner process whenever the reporter is loaded, and the attacker-controlled URL can serve different payloads over time. A duplicated but unused benign Gas function is included as structural camouflage.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-log (version 1.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-log across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove chai-log from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If chai-log was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-log before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-log-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.