chai-deflectnpm
Malicious code in chai-deflect (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require('chai-deflect'), index.js top-level invokes launchDeflectBootstrap() which detaches a child process running lib/caller.js. caller.js issues an HTTP GET to http://server-genimi-check.vercel.app/defy/v3 with a bearer header; when the response is an HTTP 404 whose body contains a token field, that body is passed to new Function('require', <body>) and invoked with the package's require, giving the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution on any host that imports the module. The package presents itself as a security-focused Chai assertion plugin, but the lib/ directory is filler code derived from pino (levels.js, multistream.js, proto.js, transport.js, worker.js) unrelated to Chai, and lib/const.js hides a base64-encoded secondary URL (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK, an anonymous paste service) disguised as a DEV_API_KEY constant. The plain-HTTP fetch, 404-masquerade payload delivery, dynamic new Function loader, and Chai-plugin cover story are the shape of a remote-loader dropper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-deflect (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-deflect across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-deflect is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If chai-deflect was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-deflect before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-deflect-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.