chai-as-predictednpm
Malicious code in chai-as-predicted (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name 'chai-as-predicted' impersonates the popular 'chai-as-promised' assertion library, but ships unrelated code disguised as pino logger internals. The exported middleware in index.js spawns a detached background Node process running lib/initializeCaller.js as soon as a consumer invokes it. lib/initializeCaller.js base64-decodes a hardcoded URL (https://amethyst-lorrin-26.tiiny.site/index.json) and a custom 'x-secret-key' header, performs an HTTP GET with retries, and passes the response body's.data.cookie field to new Function.constructor('require', response) which is then invoked with the real require — executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges on the installer's machine. The C2 URL and headers are stored as base64 strings inside a fake process.env object and decoded with atob() at runtime to evade plaintext URL scanning. The destination is an anonymous free-hosting domain with mutable, unauthenticated content. Consumers tricked by the typosquat name into requiring this package and calling its middleware will execute arbitrary remote code.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-as-predicted (version 6.0.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-as-predicted across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-as-predicted establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If chai-as-predicted was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-as-predicted before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-as-predicted-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.