chai-as-patchnpm
Malicious code in chai-as-patch (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package is a typosquat of chai-as-promised that delivers remote code execution to any installer that requires it and invokes the exported middleware. index.js spawns a detached, stdio-ignored child process running lib/caller.js. caller.js fetches https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3 (a free anonymous JSON paste host) via axios, extracts the .cookie field from the response, and passes it into new Function.constructor('require', s), then invokes the resulting function with the real require — giving the paste host's controller arbitrary code execution in the consumer's Node process. The C2 URL is base64-encoded and hidden inside a fake process.env-shaped object (DEV_API_KEY: "aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1hSR0Yz"); a second encoded paste ID (4NAKK) is stored in lib/const.js. The package metadata further obfuscates intent: name mimics chai-as-promised, description claims to be a vulnerability manager, keywords are pino-related, and the bug tracker points at an unrelated domain. The detached+unref'd subprocess pattern is intended to hide the loader from the calling process. Multiple independent block signals are present: anonymous-host remote-code fetch with no integrity check, dynamic Function-constructor execution of attacker-controlled bytes, base64-concealed C2, hidden detached subprocess delivery, and typosquat naming.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-as-patch (version 1.1.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-as-patch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-as-patch establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If chai-as-patch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-as-patch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-as-patch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.