chai-as-operatednpm
Malicious code in chai-as-operated (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name impersonates the widely-used chai-as-promised (README instructs chai.use(chaiAsOperated)) and the README badges further impersonate pino (npm/GitHub Actions shields point at pinojs/pino). On require('chai-as-operated'), index.js exposes a middleware factory that spawns a detached node./lib/initializeCaller.js. That script defines a fake process object containing base64-obfuscated values (DEV_API_KEY decodes to https://amethyst-lorrin-26.tiiny.site/index.json, plus obfuscated x-secret-key header credentials), then performs axios.get(apiEndpoint,...) and executes the response body via new Function.constructor('require', response)(require) with retry logic. The remote payload runs with full Node require access in a detached background process. The destination is a free tiiny.site host — author-mutable, anonymous infrastructure — and the URL is hidden behind base64 to evade casual review and string scanners. This is a classic typosquat + remote-execution dropper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-as-operated (version 6.0.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-as-operated across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-as-operated is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If chai-as-operated was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-as-operated before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-as-operated-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.