chai-as-docnpm
Malicious code in chai-as-doc (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package presents itself as pino-style logging middleware but on require() spawns a detached Node child that runs lib/initializeCaller.js. That script base64-decodes a hardcoded URL (stored as a fake DEV_API_KEY constant) resolving to https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df, POSTs the entire process.env object to it with an x-secret-header, and then passes the HTTP response body to new Function("require", response.data) and invokes it with the local require. This gives the remote host arbitrary code execution inside the installer's Node process with full environment/credential access. The base64 obfuscation of the endpoint, the disguised middleware cover story, and the name resembling chai/chai-as-promised are consistent with a typosquat supply-chain attack.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-as-doc (version 2.3.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-as-doc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-as-doc is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If chai-as-doc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-as-doc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-as-doc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.