chai-as-disarmednpm
chai-as-disarmed is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10042) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 3.2.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in chai-as-disarmed (npm)
What this malware does
Package name typosquats chai-as-promised while the README and keywords impersonate pino to bait installs. On require(), index.js detach-spawns lib/caller.js, which decodes a base64-stored URL to https://api.jsonstorage.net/v1/json/2ef8c758-.../a179ea35-..., issues an authenticated GET (header name and value are also base64-hidden inside a local object that shadows process.env), and executes the returned .cookie string via new Function.constructor('require', s)(require) — granting the remote operator arbitrary code execution in the installer's Node.js process with full require access. The fetch retries up to 5 times. The remote content sits in a mutable third-party JSON store, so the executed payload can be swapped at any time without republishing the package. None of this behavior corresponds to the advertised chai/pino functionality.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-as-disarmed (version 3.2.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-as-disarmed across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-as-disarmed is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove chai-as-disarmed, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If chai-as-disarmed was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-as-disarmed before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-as-disarmed-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.