chai-as-constnpm
Malicious code in chai-as-const (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a disguised dropper. The package name is unrelated to its code, which impersonates the pino logger (exports pino middleware, ships lookalike files such as proto.js, redaction.js, transport.js, multistream.js). On first invocation of the exported middleware, index.js spawns a detached background task in lib/initializeCaller.js that (1) base64-decodes a hardcoded endpoint (https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/...), (2) POSTs the full process.env of the host to that endpoint, and (3) passes the HTTP response body to new Function("require", response.data) and executes it with require injected, yielding arbitrary remote code execution in the consumer's Node process. This combines credential/secret theft (all environment variables including CI tokens, cloud keys, and application secrets) with an attacker-controlled RCE channel, hidden behind base64 obfuscation of the C2 URL and a name that misrepresents the package's purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-as-const (version 1.4.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-as-const across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-as-const is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If chai-as-const was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-as-const before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-as-const-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.