chai-as-assurednpm
Malicious code in chai-as-assured (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
chai-as-assured impersonates the popular chai-as-promised package (matching README, author, and API surface). When the exported plugin function is invoked under normal usage, an async IIFE in the plugin body base64-decodes a hardcoded URL (https://amethyst-lorrin-26.tiiny.site/index.json), performs an axios.get against that anonymous third-party host with a disguised header, and executes the response's cookie field as JavaScript via new Function.constructor('require', response)(require). The fetched payload runs with full Node module privileges (filesystem, network, child_process, etc.) because require is passed in. The C2 URL, header name (x-secret-key), and header value are concealed as base64 strings inside a fake local process.env object (DEV_API_KEY / DEV_SECRET_KEY / DEV_SECRET_VALUE) that shadows Node's global to evade casual source review. The combination of name-confusion against a top-100 chai ecosystem package, deliberate obfuscation of attacker infrastructure, an unpinned anonymous tiiny.site host, and dynamic execution of the fetched response with require is an unambiguous remote-code-execution dropper targeting any project that installs and loads this plugin.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for chai-as-assured (version 7.1.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging chai-as-assured across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
chai-as-assured establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If chai-as-assured was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks chai-as-assured before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks chai-as-assured-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.