cerebrum-corenpm
Malicious code in cerebrum-core (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook runs setup.js, which decodes an embedded base64 string into a tar.gz file at ../../../temp_bundle.tar.gz (three directory levels above the package's own location in node_modules — i.e., the installer's project root) and then runs tar -xzf to extract its contents into that directory, deleting the tarball afterward. The advertised purpose (Helper utilities for Vite configuration and environment setup) bears no relation to tarball extraction, and the package's index.js is a stub that only emits two console.log calls. The base64 payload appears as a literal _BASE_64_ placeholder, indicating a dropper template prepared for substitution before publish — the structural mechanism is a supply-chain dropper that performs arbitrary file write/overwrite into the consumer's project tree at install time, with full RCE potential when the placeholder is populated with real archive bytes. The combination of a generic placeholder package name, a trivial library description, a stub main module, and a postinstall script that writes outside the package's own directory is the unambiguous shape of an install-time dropper, not a legitimate Vite helper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cerebrum-core (version 1.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cerebrum-core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove cerebrum-core from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If cerebrum-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cerebrum-core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cerebrum-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.