cdn-img-fetchnpm
cdn-img-fetch is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17320) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in cdn-img-fetch (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of cdn-img-fetch, index.js unconditionally invokes https.get against https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cavecrew/proj/main/banner.png and pipes the response into a hidden dot-file at os.tmpdir()/._cif_data (written via a.part file and renamed into place). The source is a mutable main-branch URL in a personal GitHub account unrelated to the npm publisher, with no version pin, hash, or signature check, so whoever controls that repo controls the bytes dropped onto the installer's disk on every import. The fetch fires automatically as an IIFE at module load, not from any user-invoked API, and the destination filename is deliberately hidden. The package advertises itself as a CDN image cache helper, which does not explain an import-time download of an opaque file from a third-party personal repo to a hidden tmp location. This is the first-stage dropper / staging shape: the current fetched bytes are written but not executed in this version, but the mechanism gives an off-registry actor a persistent import-time write primitive into every installer's tmp directory.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cdn-img-fetch (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cdn-img-fetch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove cdn-img-fetch from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If cdn-img-fetch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cdn-img-fetch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cdn-img-fetch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.