Which versions of cb-wallet-data are malicious?

The following npm versions of cb-wallet-data are flagged malicious: 0.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate cb-wallet-data if I installed it?

cb-wallet-data is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed cb-wallet-data — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If cb-wallet-data was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is cb-wallet-data part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — cb-wallet-data is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003425 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find cb-wallet-data across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cb-wallet-data (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cb-wallet-data across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

cb-wallet-datanpm

Malicious code in cb-wallet-data (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4506

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall cb-wallet-data

What this malware does

Package name 'cb-wallet-data' targets a presumed Coinbase-internal namespace and is published by an unaffiliated party. Both postinstall.js (npm install lifecycle hook) and index.js (main, runs on require) issue an unconditional HTTPS GET to https://icy-cell-fb53.gh0stfqce25.workers.dev/poc carrying the package name and installer Node.js runtime version as query parameters. Any developer or build system whose package manager misroutes the internal name 'cb-wallet-data' to the public npm registry will silently transmit the existence of that internal name plus their Node version to a third-party Cloudflare Workers endpoint without consent. While the payload is narrow (no credential or environment scraping), the channel is a confirmed install-time and import-time beacon to attacker/researcher-controlled infrastructure, exposing internal namespace and toolchain metadata that itself is sensitive supply-chain reconnaissance data.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9d076ee3d487c7c10f785494c4391e39eb327b696224d5653746144fa5ac8d37

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cb-wallet-data (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cb-wallet-data across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cb-wallet-data is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cb-wallet-data was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cb-wallet-data before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. cb-wallet-data on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003425

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks cb-wallet-data-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring