cardsmobile-command-utilsnpm
cardsmobile-command-utils is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12530) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.9.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in cardsmobile-command-utils (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js loads _bridge.js which selects a platform-specific URL, downloads a binary over HTTPS from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers subdomains, writes it to a hidden temp path with a decoy name (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe. The destination hostnames are constructed via [...].join('') string-fragment obfuscation (e.g. ["oob-","worker.cf","102-baf.work","ers.d","ev"].join("") resolving to oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, plus oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev and oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) to defeat static searches for the C2 infrastructure. If HTTPS fetches fail, _bridge.js falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel: it queries a chunk count at c.<domain> and reassembles a base64-encoded payload from <i>.<domain> TXT records under attacker-controlled zones sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. No signature or hash verification is performed on the fetched bytes, decoy filenames masquerade as.NET diagnostics/cache artifacts, staging uses hidden dot-files, execution is detached, and the loader honors DO_NOT_TRACK to suppress activity on researcher machines. Cover-story comments (// Clean up temporary files after extraction, // Binary-safe buffer concatenation) are unrelated to the surrounding code.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cardsmobile-command-utils (version 35.9.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cardsmobile-command-utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cardsmobile-command-utils establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If cardsmobile-command-utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cardsmobile-command-utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cardsmobile-command-utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.