cards-forms-clone-credit-clonenpm
cards-forms-clone-credit-clone is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12525) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.7.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in cards-forms-clone-credit-clone (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of cards-forms-clone-credit-clone, index.js loads helpers.js which auto-invokes a setup routine that detects the host OS/arch, downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers subdomains (hostnames assembled via string-split.join("") to evade static inspection), with a DNS TXT record fallback that reassembles base64-encoded payload chunks from TXT records under.dl.wel1.ru subdomains (sdk/ext/pkg/net.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (dotnet_diag.exe,.cache_), chmod 0755, and executed detached via spawn("/bin/sh",...) or cmd.exe /c start. No pinning, no signature or hash verification, and the fetched content is unrelated to any documented package purpose. The name mimics a legitimate-sounding forms/credit-card handling library; there is no such functionality in the code.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cards-forms-clone-credit-clone (version 35.7.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cards-forms-clone-credit-clone across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cards-forms-clone-credit-clone is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove cards-forms-clone-credit-clone, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If cards-forms-clone-credit-clone was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cards-forms-clone-credit-clone before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cards-forms-clone-credit-clone-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.