Which versions of capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle are malicious?

The following npm versions of capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle are flagged malicious: 0.0.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle if I installed it?

capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle is associated with the GHSA-j9cw-mx5f-7vpv campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle (version 0.0.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgooglenpm

Malicious code in capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-190765

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle

What this malware does

The package capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle was found to contain malicious code.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

This package was compromised by the Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming NPM worm. The malicious payload steals tokens and credentials and publishes them to GitHub. The worm will propogate itself to NPM packages the user owns and establish persistence is a GitHub action. The package may also destroy the user's home directory.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

4525f68cbed421748f3df761fdcb83a7977e7a307a47bcddf47cbbf6a0ca547e

9b87f31a2266c9633975e61214361882324c01060c614e04b15ac2e3a570fe6f

9a1c6537a8d1421886264b4e0dec318f21e88818a0fa66136f9e4281f29ffa71

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle (version 0.0.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-j9cw-mx5f-7vpv

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks capacitor-plugin-scgssigninwithgoogle-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring