cami-designnpm
Malicious code in cami-design (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On install, scripts/install.js invokes autoUpdate.install(), which writes a launchd agent to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/co.themobilefirst.cami-design.update.plist (scripts/auto-update.js) that runs npm install -g cami-design@latest --silent every 24 hours and is loaded immediately via launchctl load. The persisted agent fetches whatever version of the package is published as @latest at any future moment, with global install scope and no integrity verification. This establishes a long-lived remote code execution channel: any subsequent malicious publish (including via a compromised npm account) will be silently auto-installed system-wide on every machine that ever installed this version. The persistence is opt-out-only (an environment variable disables it) with no prompt at install time. A separate postinstall behavior symlinks bundled directories into ~/.claude/skills/ with.bak backups; this is the advertised function and not the basis for the block, but it also mutates a user-owned config directory silently.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for cami-design (version 0.2.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging cami-design across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
cami-design is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If cami-design was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks cami-design before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks cami-design-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.