bytecorenpm
Malicious code in bytecore (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package masquerades as a pino-like logging middleware (README is copied from pino, exports a pino property, mimics pino's option shape) but the middleware factory in index.js spawns a detached node lib/caller.js child process when the exported function is invoked. lib/caller.js obfuscates a hardcoded C2 URL by shadowing the real process global with a local object whose env holds base64-encoded strings; decoding DEV_API_KEY yields https://jsonkeeper.com/b/BADC6. The script GETs that anonymous, mutable paste host with axios (retried 5 times) and passes the response body to new Function.constructor("require", s)(require), executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges and direct access to require. Any application that installs bytecore and mounts the middleware (app.use(require('bytecore')())) runs whatever code the paste currently serves. The combination of (a) mutable anonymous paste host as code source, (b) require-passing eval of fetched bytes, (c) base64 + process-shadowing obfuscation of the C2, and (d) impersonation of a popular logger to lure installers is an unambiguous remote-code-execution backdoor.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bytecore (version 5.3.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bytecore across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bytecore establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bytecore was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bytecore before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bytecore-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.