What does the bpm-foundation-common malware do?

On require('bpm-foundation-common'), index.js loads _loader.js which assembles C2 hostnames via runtime string-joining (e.g. ["oob-worker.","cf101-adf.","workers.d","ev"].join("")) with a DNS-TXT fallback to *.wel1.ru subdomains, downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp/.cache_ or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_ .exe, chmods 0755, and detached-spawns it via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Dangerous API names are obfuscated (require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade static analysis. A second dropper implementation with the same machinery (base64-decoded payload, /bin/sh -c spawn, chmod 0755) is bundled in lib/telemetry.js as an alternate payload path. The pack

Which versions of bpm-foundation-common are malicious?

The following npm versions of bpm-foundation-common are flagged malicious: 35.9.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bpm-foundation-common if I installed it?

bpm-foundation-common establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed bpm-foundation-common — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If bpm-foundation-common was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is bpm-foundation-common part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bpm-foundation-common is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015274 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find bpm-foundation-common across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bpm-foundation-common (version 35.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bpm-foundation-common across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

bpm-foundation-commonnpm

bpm-foundation-common is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13107) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.9.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in bpm-foundation-common (npm)

MAL-2026-13107

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall bpm-foundation-common

What this malware does

On require('bpm-foundation-common'), index.js loads loader.js which assembles C2 hostnames via runtime string-joining (e.g. ["oob-worker.","cf101-adf.","workers.d","ev"].join("")) with a DNS-TXT fallback to *.wel1.ru subdomains, downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp/.cache<hex> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755, and detached-spawns it via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Dangerous API names are obfuscated (require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade static analysis. A second dropper implementation with the same machinery (base64-decoded payload, /bin/sh -c spawn, chmod 0755) is bundled in lib/telemetry.js as an alternate payload path. The package has no documented native-build purpose that would justify fetching and executing a remote binary on require().

Malicious versions

1 flagged

35.9.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

39a9ca2287ec8bbf000796cf1f41fbc088f7d8a3a37cd8d8eadc970cf19abc91

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bpm-foundation-common (version 35.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bpm-foundation-common across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bpm-foundation-common establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bpm-foundation-common was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bpm-foundation-common before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. bpm-foundation-common on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 35.9.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015274

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks bpm-foundation-common-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database