bpm-foundation-bundle-optimizationnpm
bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13106) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.1.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization (npm)
What this malware does
Requiring this package triggers vendor.js, which reconstructs Cloudflare Workers hostnames (oob-worker.cf10*.workers.dev) and DNS-fallback domains (*.dl.wel1.ru) from split-string arrays joined at runtime, downloads a platform-specific binary over https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under decoy names (.cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. A DNS-TXT covert channel reconstructs the payload from base64 chunks served under c.<domain> and N.<domain> when the primary hosts are unreachable. A sibling lib/telemetry.js contains a parallel dropper implementation (fs.chmodSync 0755, cp.spawn '/bin/sh -c... &', base64-chunk reconstruction) staged in the tarball but not on the auto-executed graph of this version. The destination hostnames are not the package's declared publisher, the fetched bytes are unpinned and unverified, and the drop path fires on any require() of the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization (version 35.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bpm-foundation-bundle-optimization-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.