boxy-loadernpm
boxy-loader is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13055) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.4.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in boxy-loader (npm)
What this malware does
On require('boxy-loader'), index.js loads adapter.js which executes setup() at module top level. setup() picks a platform-specific remote path, downloads an opaque executable from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (hostnames such as oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev are assembled at runtime by joining split string fragments), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start. If the HTTPS fetch fails, loadViaDns() falls back to resolveTxt('c.<domain>') to obtain a chunk count and then resolveTxt('<i>.<domain>') against *.dl.wel1.ru, base64-decodes the concatenated TXT records, writes the resulting bytes to disk and executes them — a DNS-tunneled payload channel designed to survive HTTPS egress filtering. Both the CDN host list and the DNS discovery domains are constructed from split string fragments to hide destinations from string-matching scans. The fetched executable is not shipped in the tarball, is not pinned or hash-verified, and is unrelated to any documented package purpose; the staging filename decoys (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe) further conceal it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for boxy-loader (version 35.4.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging boxy-loader across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove boxy-loader from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If boxy-loader was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks boxy-loader before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks boxy-loader-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.