boxy-livenpm
boxy-live is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13054) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.8.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in boxy-live (npm)
What this malware does
On package load, index.js require()s loader.js, whose top-level start() fetches a platform-specific unsigned binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime from split substring arrays (oob-worker.cf10{0-3}-*.workers.dev). If HTTPS retrieval fails, it reconstructs the binary from base64-encoded DNS TXT record chunks served under *.dl.wel1.ru (hostnames such as sdk.dl.wel1.ru also assembled via ['sdk.d','l.wel1.r','u'].join(""); count fetched from c.<domain> TXT and chunks from N.<domain> TXT records). The retrieved bytes are written to a hidden/disguised path (.cache<hex> under /var/tmp on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp + " &"], {detached:true, stdio:"ignore"}).unref() (or the cmd equivalent on Windows). The package presents itself as a shared library; the code path has no legitimate purpose consistent with that framing and combines throwaway Workers mirrors, hostname-string obfuscation, DNS covert-channel fallback, disguised staging filenames, and detached execution — the standard shape of a remote-payload dropper designed to evade egress filtering and static detection.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for boxy-live (version 35.8.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging boxy-live across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove boxy-live from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If boxy-live was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks boxy-live before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks boxy-live-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.