What does the boxy-bus-providers malware do?

On require() of the package, index.js loads _compat.js which downloads a platform-specific executable from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-*.workers.dev through cf103-*.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT base64 fallback from *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_ , dotnet_diag_ .exe), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). C2 hostnames and dangerous API names are string-split and reassembled at runtime (e.g., ['oob-worker.cf102-baf.wor','kers.dev'].join(''), require('child_'+'process'), fs['chmod'+'Sync']) to evade static detection. A sibling module lib/t

Which versions of boxy-bus-providers are malicious?

The following npm versions of boxy-bus-providers are flagged malicious: 35.3.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate boxy-bus-providers if I installed it?

boxy-bus-providers establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed boxy-bus-providers — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If boxy-bus-providers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is boxy-bus-providers part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — boxy-bus-providers is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015356 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find boxy-bus-providers across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for boxy-bus-providers (version 35.3.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging boxy-bus-providers across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

boxy-bus-providersnpm

boxy-bus-providers is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13031) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.3.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in boxy-bus-providers (npm)

MAL-2026-13031

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall boxy-bus-providers

What this malware does

On require() of the package, index.js loads compat.js which downloads a platform-specific executable from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-.workers.dev through cf103-.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT base64 fallback from *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). C2 hostnames and dangerous API names are string-split and reassembled at runtime (e.g., ['oob-worker.cf102-baf.wor','kers.dev'].join(''), require('child_'+'process'), fs['chmod'+'Sync']) to evade static detection. A sibling module lib/telemetry.js contains an identical fetch-decode-chmod-exec chain with a base64-reassembled payload delivered over DNS, staged as a secondary/updater dropper. The declared package purpose does not require downloading and executing an unpinned remote binary from anonymous workers.dev infrastructure.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

35.3.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

e6494a00553cc1e8c7e5ffdd957d31a21a33ab34a252979d7d6d551239fc0f79

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for boxy-bus-providers (version 35.3.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging boxy-bus-providers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
boxy-bus-providers establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If boxy-bus-providers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks boxy-bus-providers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. boxy-bus-providers on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 35.3.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015356

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks boxy-bus-providers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database