bolt-delivery-menu-appnpm
Malicious code in bolt-delivery-menu-app (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package executes a DNS-based beacon at both install time (package.json scripts.install runs node index.js) and on every require() of the module. lib/core.js reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and process.cwd(), concatenates them with a campaign tag into a single label, and triggers dns.resolve4 against that label under the attacker-controlled domain oob.sl4x0.xyz, leaking installer host identity over DNS (a channel chosen to bypass HTTP-egress controls). The C2 domain and Node built-in names (os, dns, process, resolve4) are stored as char-code arrays in lib/b02e30.js and lib/6ad264.js to defeat string-grep scanners. The package name bolt-delivery-menu-app impersonates the Bolt delivery brand while shipping generic 'Enterprise Utilities' boilerplate as its cover story, and the author email [email protected] resolves to the same domain as the exfil destination — the typosquat lure, the cover identity, and the C2 are one operation. README falsely claims 'No network requests'.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bolt-delivery-menu-app (version 9.9.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bolt-delivery-menu-app across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bolt-delivery-menu-app establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bolt-delivery-menu-app was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bolt-delivery-menu-app before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bolt-delivery-menu-app-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.