bnpl-corenpm
bnpl-core is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13023) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.8.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-core (npm)
What this malware does
index.js unconditionally requires./setup on load. setup.js constructs Cloudflare Workers hostnames via string-splitting array joins (e.g. oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf100-416, cf99-9b3, cf101-adf under workers.dev) and, if HTTPS fetches fail, retrieves a base64-chunked payload over DNS TXT records under *.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under names masquerading as system tooling (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), chmodded 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c. A TTL lock file at /tmp/.analytics_state throttles re-execution. package.json advertises a 'core runtime' with an empty dependency set and a trivial BnplCore init/version/configure surface as a cover story; DISABLE_TELEMETRY-style env checks reinforce the disguise. The host is anonymous Cloudflare Workers infrastructure with no publisher relationship, the fetch is unpinned and unverified, and the payload is opaque.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-core (version 35.8.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-core from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.