bnpl-blocks-typesnpm
bnpl-blocks-types is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13020) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.2.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-types (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of bnpl-blocks-types, index.js loads helpers.js which selects a platform-specific path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package.exe, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package-arm64) and downloads a binary from hostnames reconstructed at runtime via array.join to defeat static inspection: oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev. If HTTPS retrieval fails, a fallback assembles the payload from base64-encoded DNS TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under decoy names (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows, hidden.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod 0755, and spawned detached and unref'd via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true}). A second dropper copy is staged as lib/telemetry.js (81 KB, framed as an analytics SDK) containing the same base64-assemble, chmod 0755, and detached /bin/sh spawn pattern, with require('child_'+'process') and fs['chmod'+'Sync'] string-split obfuscation. Behavior is guarded by an mtime cache and opt-out env vars, consistent with a persistent, staged install-time dropper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-types (version 35.2.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-types across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-types is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-types was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-types before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-types-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.