bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttonsnpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13007) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.7.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, index.js side-loads adapter.js which selects a platform-specific asset, downloads bytes over HTTPS from hostnames reconstructed at runtime by joining split string fragments (oob-worker.cf10{0..3}-*.workers.dev), writes the bytes to a disguised temp file (/tmp/.cache<hex> on POSIX, %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), sets mode 0o755, and spawns the file detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. A DNS-TXT fallback channel queries c.<domain> then N.<domain> records under *.dl.wel1.ru, base64-decodes the concatenated chunks, and executes the resulting binary when the HTTPS mirrors fail. The package advertises itself as a native bridge with a trivial no-op class in index.js; the dropper logic is hidden in _adapter.js with cover-story variable names (analytics_state, telemetry). Hostname reconstruction from split literals is a deliberate static-scanner evasion technique, and DNS-TXT payload staging is a covert-channel technique to bypass HTTPS egress filtering.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons (version 35.7.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-tab-buttons-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.