bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-bannernpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13005) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.1.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of this package, index.js loads polyfill.js which selects a platform-specific download URL, reconstructs hostnames via array.join string-splitting to evade static analysis (resolving to oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, with a DNS-TXT fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru), fetches a native binary, writes it to a disguised filename under /var/tmp or %TEMP% (e.g..cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe) mimicking dotnet diagnostic files, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with stdio ignored and unref(). Execution is gated by opt-out environment variables and a time-based cache flag file. The package advertises itself as a BNPL shopping banner / platform adapter and has no legitimate reason to fetch and execute a native binary at import time. The hostname obfuscation, disguised temp filenames, DNS-TXT dead-drop fallback, and detached background execution are characteristic malicious dropper behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner (version 35.1.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.