bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-groupnpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12996) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, support.js selects a platform-specific asset path and fetches a binary over HTTPS from obfuscated *.workers.dev hosts assembled at runtime via string-fragment.join('') (e.g. 'oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev', 'oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev'), with a DNS TXT chunked fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru (e.g. 'sdk.dl.wel1.ru'). The fetched bytes are written to a temp directory under a disguised name (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod 0755 is applied on Unix, and the file is spawned detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c. Destination hosts are split into fragments and reassembled to evade string scanning. An execution-stamp file suppresses re-running. The package advertises itself as a native bridge but ships no native source, so the only effect of importing it is dropping and executing attacker-controlled code on the installer's host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group (version 35.2.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-link-group-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.