bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-headernpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12991) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, index.js loads bridge.js which fetches an OS-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS-over-TXT base64 fallback to *.wel1.ru. The retrieved bytes are written to a hidden path in /var/tmp or %TEMP% under masquerading names (.cache<rand> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows), chmodded to 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. Destination hostnames are reconstructed at runtime from split string fragments joined with.join(""), and the drop is gated by DISABLE_TELEMETRY / DO_NOT_TRACK environment checks to present as opt-out telemetry. A freshness marker is written to /tmp/.analytics_state. The package presents itself as a mobile BNPL SDK; none of the fetch-write-execute behavior relates to that stated purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header (version 35.2.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-header-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.