bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-buttonnpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12989) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.3.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js loads support.js whose top-level main() downloads a platform-specific binary from author-controlled hosts assembled via string-array concatenation (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru) with a DNS-TXT base64 fallback. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under stealth names such as dotnet_diag<hex>.exe and.cache_<hex>, chmod'd 0755 on POSIX (with the API name assembled as 'chmod'+'Sync'), and executed detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start /b. A second dropper is shipped in lib/telemetry.js (81KB, framed as an 'Analytics SDK') implementing the same base64-decode + chmod-via-string-concat + detached spawn pattern as an alternate loader. child_process is resolved via require('child_' + 'process') and destination hostnames are split across arrays to evade static analysis. No version pin, no hash or signature verification, and a /tmp stamp file is used for rate-limiting. The package name and metadata claim a mobile BNPL floating-button UI component, which conflicts with the shipped behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button (version 35.3.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.